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研究报告:高华证券-亚洲经济分析:出口拉动的增长 短期内向好-140207

研报作者:Andrew Tilton,Goohoon Kwon 来自:高华证券 时间:2014-02-07 16:16:17
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2014年2月7日 Issue No: 14/06 亚洲经济分析 研究报告 出口拉动的增长:短期内向好,长期内面临挑战 由于对新兴市场增长的担忧加剧,投资者希望了解2014年亚洲新兴市场出口拉 动增长的潜力,其中许多人对此感到怀疑。

从周期性角度来看,我们预计2014年主要发达经济体,尤其是美国的经济增长 将加速,从而小幅提振亚太地区的出口和GDP增速(各国的提振幅度为20-70个 基点不等),并抵消新兴市场需求增长的走软和亚太地区信贷周期的衰减。

但从结构性角度看,亚洲新兴经济体出口驱动的增长面临两大挑战。

首先,中国 出口在发达市场所占份额的快速上升期似乎已经结束,其对中国增长和从其它地 区的进口的积极溢出效应也是如此,原因在于中国加入WTO的益处已然显现, 且以外汇衡量的劳动力成本也已大幅上升。

第二大挑战是发达市场给亚洲新兴市场带来的潜在增长率将下降。

由于人口结构 不利,发达市场需求的趋势增长率可能会放缓,且进口密集度可能较过去下降 (我们已经看到这一迹象)。

此外,即便对发达市场的绝对出口增速保持稳定, 其对于亚太地区GDP的相对重要性也将下降,除非是在那些经济增速或汇率大幅 下滑的国家。

如果亚洲新兴市场的出口要继续成为经济快速增长的来源,其在全球市场中赢取 份额将相对更为重要–这凸显了加强竞争力的必要,其途径或者是通过更高效的 投资,或者是通过(不甚理想的)货币贬值。

本期内容 Andrew Tilton +852-2978-1802 andrew.tilton@gs.com 高盛(亚洲)有限责任公司 Goohoon Kwon, CFA +82(2)3788-1775 goohoon.kwon@gs.com 高盛(亚洲)有限责任公司首尔分公司 Tushar Poddar +91(22)6616-9042 tushar.poddar@gs.com 高盛(印度)证券私人有限公司 崔历 +852-2978-0784 li.cui@gs.com 高盛(亚洲)有限责任公司 宋宇 +86(10)6627-3111 yu.song@ghsl.cn 北京高华证券有限责任公司 Mark Tan +65-6889-2472 mark.tan@gs.com 高盛(新加坡)私人公司 Chiwoong Lee +82(2)3788-1722 chiwoong.lee@gs.com 高盛(亚洲)有限责任公司首尔分公司 邓敏强 +852-2978-6634 mk.tang@gs.com 高盛(亚洲)有限责任公司 Jonathan Sequeira +852-2978-0698 jonathan.sequeira@gs.com 高盛(亚洲)有限责任公司 魏静娴 +852-2978-0106 maggie.wei@gs.com 高盛(亚洲)有限责任公司 Vishal Vaibhaw +91(22)6616-9376 vishal.vaibhaw@gs.com 高盛(印度)证券私人有限公司 Hui Ying Chan +65-6654-5459 huiying.chan@gs.com 高盛(新加坡)私人公司 投资者不应视本报告为作出投资决策的唯一因素。

有关分析师的申明和其他重要信息,见信息披露附录,或参阅 /research/hedge.html。

高盛集团 全球投资研究 Export-ledgrowthinAsia:Bettershort-term,challengedlong-term page2 Regionalrecap:ForecastingslowergrowthinChina;improvingtrade balancesinASEAN page10 Asiaex-Japaneconomiccalendar page14 Forecasttables page15 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究2 Export-led growth in Asia: Better short-term, challenged long-term With concerns over emerging-market (EM) growth mounting, investors are curious—and many doubtful—about the potential for exports to drive growth in emerging Asia in 2014. We see reason for tempered optimism over the next year, as exports to developed markets (DM) pick up, more than offsetting the drag from slower exports to the rest of EM. Longer-term, we identify several challenges that will pressure the region to improve competitiveness or else lower its sights for export growth. Better DM growth should boost Asian exports in 2014 The good news, in our view, is that DM demand is likely to pick up in 2014. Indeed, it did already in late 2013—our Current Activity Indicators (CAIs) suggest a notable acceleration in growth in the largest developed economies (Exhibit 1). Exhibit 1: Better growth in DM in late 2013 Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. But, what matters more from the point of view of Asian exports is foreign demand rather than GDP growth, and what it will be in the future rather than what it’s been in the past. We have seen some improvement in domestic demand too, and we expect it to continue in the US and Europe (Japan will retrench in Q2 following the planned increase in VAT, in our view, but only represents 17% of Asia ex Japan (AEJ) export demand vs.31% for the US and 21% for Europe). Fundamental reasons for better growth in DM (forecasts in Exhibit 2) include: Less fiscal drag. After a difficult year in the US during which fiscal policy subtracted roughly 1 points from real GDP growth by our estimation, there are no further tax increases planned, spending cuts slated appear mild, and an agreement to extend the debt ceiling seems within reach (see USEconomics Analyst: 14/01 - The 2014 Political Agenda: Less Risk, Less Action, January 3,2014 and USDaily: Q&A on the Debt Limit, January 23,2014). Our European Economics team also expects less fiscal drag in 2014, although in the Euro area the difference with 2013 is more modest. Private sector adjustments since the crisis. Excess housing supply has been worked down, household balance sheets have improved, and prospects for business capital spending -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 0708091011121314 USJapan Euro Percent change, qoq annualized Percent change, qoq annualized Current Activity Indicator 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究3 appear brighter as capacity utilization has increased uncertainty about the domestic outlook has decreased. Easier financial conditions. Despite a tougher market environment in 2014, the improvement in Japanese financial conditions has been remarkable; Europe’s was also large, although now farther in the past. Exhibit 2: US, EU demand growth should be healthy in 2014 Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Mechanically what could this be worth in terms of GDP growth this year for AEJ We expect DM demand (dominated by the three countries above) to more than double its 2013 pace (admittedly from a low base) to 2.3% in 2014. We expect real import growth to rise nearly three percentage points (ppt) to 4.1%; we discuss the relationship between demand growth and imports in more detail below. Accounting for the share of value added in exports (i.e. the domestic content of exports), this would generate a real GDP growth lift from 0.2ppt (India, Indonesia) to 0.7ppt (Malaysia), without accounting for positive spillover effects into the domestic economy or better growth in third countries that export to DM—i.e. other things equal. Of course, other things are never equal. One obvious source of concern on the downside is the market pressure on more vulnerable EM economies and the likelihood that some will see slower growth in 2014, with consequences for exports to those countries. To benchmark the possible effect of this slowdown on regional exports, we calibrate the share of each AEJ economy’s exports to a set of EM markets under pressure (Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey, and within the region India and Indonesia). Exhibit 3 shows, for each country in emerging Asia, its exposure to final demand in the major DM versus the selected five EM markets, as a share of its own GDP. The exposure to demand in the DM economies ranges from 4 to 8 times the exposure to this set of EM economies, suggesting that if our forecast of DM acceleration is correct, it should significantly outweigh the drag from slower EM growth (For a related discussion of the impact of slower EM growth on DM, see Global Economics Weekly: 14/04 - What happens in EM (mostly) stays in EM, January 29,2014). Of course, this analysis does not count the direct effects of market pressure on India or Indonesia, nor does it take into account the impact on other countries’ exports if Chinese growth were to slow significantly (see EMMacro Daily - Estimating Asian countries’ export beta to regional and DM demand shocks, October 9,2013). -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 040506070809101112131415 US Japan Euro area Percent change, yoy Percent change, yoy Forecast Real domestic demand: 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究4 Exhibit 3: Exposure to demand in the largest DMs is 4-8 times that of the EMs under pressure Source: OECD. But over the longer term, exports to DM will be a smaller potential source of regional growth… Despite what we see as a slightly better outlook in the short term, export-led growth in emerging Asia in general (and China in particular) faces two structural challenges over the longer term. The first is that DM are likely to offer less potential growth to emerging Asia than in the past. This in turn is a product of three different forces. 1. Longer term, growth in developed markets is unlikely to match pre-global financial crisis (GFC) rates. During 2010-2013, real domestic demand in DM grew barely half as fast as in the years before the crisis (1.5% in 2010-2013 versus 2.7% in 2004-2007). As noted above (refer back to Exhibit 2), we expect this to improve in the short term to 2.3%—but not all the way back to the pre-crisis growth pace. There is still significant spare capacity in parts of the DM, so there is room for economies to grow above trend for a time without undue inflationary pressures. But beyond the next couple of years, fundamental growth drivers start to reassert themselves. Developed economies are at or near the productivity frontier, by definition. Most have high levels of debt, which may lead to a prolonged period of relatively tight fiscal policy and/or credit conditions, even if the main drag is behind us. And demographic transitions will keep workforce growth slow. For example, we see potential real GDP growth in the US at just under 2.5%, below the 3%+ growth we expect in the near term (see USDaily: Assessing the Slowdown in Potential Growth, November 26,2013). 2. DM growth may be less import-intensive in the future. In Exhibit 4, we calculate the sensitivity of import growth to domestic demand growth in the US, Euro area, and Japan on a rolling basis. We do this by running regressions of real import growth on real domestic demand and the change in real inventories; the lines on the exhibit show the coefficient on real domestic demand for a sample that includes the ten years up to that point. We exclude the GFC to focus on structural rather than cyclical changes (on the exhibit, years during and after the financial crisis show the coefficient only for the previous years that exclude the financial crisis). While this is hardly conclusive, and could still be contaminated by cyclical factors, it does suggest a lower elasticity (sensitivity) of import demand to domestic activity in the US and Japan recently. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Selected EM economies G-3 Percent GDPPercent GDP Domestic value added to final demand in: 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究5 On balance, we think lower import propensity is more likely to continue than not, and could even go lower (to some extent, our US forecast reflects this, with real import growth rebounding only to about 4% annually from 2014-2017, versus an average of 6% in the five years before the crisis, despite similar domestic demand growth). We are frequently asked whether the development of large-scale shale gas and oil resources could be a reason for lower US imports—but while we think this is true for energy imports, emerging Asian exports are overwhelmingly manufactured goods, and we think the impact on competitiveness outside the energy industry and closely related downstream industries (e.g. chemicals) will be considerably smaller (see USEconomics Analyst: 13/12 - The USManufacturing Renaissance: Fact or Fiction March 23,2013 and USEconomics Analyst: Is the Economy Gaining “Fracktion” October 18,2013). Other forces are at least as important, in our view: Exhibit 4: Lower propensity to import in the US and Japan *Real import growth is regressed on real domestic demand growth and the change in real inventories with a 10-year rolling window beginning in 1980. Note that GFC period is excluded; regression windows covering this period are slightly shorter. Source: Haver, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Fading effect of trade liberalization. An intensive period of trade liberalization that included NAFTA (1994), the formation of the Euro area (1999), and the founding of the WTO and China’s inclusion in it (1995 and 2001 respectively) seems likely to have been at least partly responsible for the rapid growth in trade and offshoring that occurred during the 2000s; presumably by now the “low-hanging fruit” has been plucked. Improved cost position in the US and Japan. Taking into account labor costs, productivity, and currency shifts, Japan and the US have gained manufacturing competitiveness relative to the EU and emerging Asia in recent years (Exhibit 5; (see also Emerging Markets Weekly: 14/01 - US recovery will help but is no panacea, January 9,2014). In China, double-digit urban wage growth in recent years alongside solid renminbi appreciation—nearly 20% on a broad trade-weighted basis since mid- 2011—has increased costs meaningfully (more on the market share implications of this below). Competitiveness can improve via productivity gain and weak or negative nominal wage growth—as in the US following the crisis—or via depreciation—as has occurred more recently in Japan (the chart data only go through 2012, but the yen was 22% weaker versus the dollar in 2013) and some of the more stressed EMs. 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 90929496980002040608101214 US Euro-Area Japan Coefficient Coefficient Beta of import growth to domestic demand growth* 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究6 Exhibit 5: The US and Japan have seen gains in relative manufacturing competitiveness in recent years Source: Haver, CEIC, Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. 3. In relative terms, the rest of the world—and particularly the developed world—has gotten smaller. A long period of high growth in emerging Asia has increased its relative size in the world, and therefore decreased the potential contribution exports to DM can make to growth. Put another way, the same rate of growth in DM demand—and exports to the rest of the world—means less when denominated in emerging Asia GDP. This is particularly true in China, given its world-beating growth in past decades (see EMMacro Daily - When the world is not enough: China’s expanding need for sustainable internal growth, September 10,2013). Exhibits 6 and 7 show that exports to DM, as a share of GDP, have fallen for almost every country in the region since the early 2000s. In several countries, exports to DM are only about half as important as they were in the early 2000s. India is the only case where the share has risen; in Korea it has been fairly steady. Exhibit 6: Developed markets get smaller from the perspective of China, Korea, and Indonesia… Exhibit 7: …and from the perspective of the small economies in the region Source: IMF, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Source: IMF, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 00010203040506070809101112 USSouth Korea Japan EU China Indonesia Index Index Unit labor costs in manufacturing indices: 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 00020406081012 China Indonesia Korea India Percent GDPPercent GDP Exports to DM: 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 00020406081012 Malaysia Singapore Thailand Philippines Taiwan Percent GDPPercent GDP Exports to DM: 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究7 In summary, the potential for emerging Asia to grow its own real GDP in dollar terms (i.e. without large devaluations) via exports to developed markets is still there, but is smaller in most countries than in the past. This is partly a reflection of what is likely to be slightly more subdued DM import growth than in the heyday of the pre-financial crisis years, and partly a reflection of the very strong growth of many emerging Asian economies in the past. …and exports from emerging Asia may no longer take a growing slice of the DM demand “pie” The second structural challenge for emerging Asian exports is that Chinese exports are no longer gaining market share in the developed world. For the better part of a decade, Chinese exports enjoyed a period of hypergrowth as trade liberalization—particularly the entry of China into the WTO in 2001—magnified the benefits of huge cost advantages from Chinese production, and buoyant credit growth in DM helped fuel demand. Chinese exports in turn had positive spillovers to the rest of the region via supply chain linkages (China importing components and materials to be assembled for re-export) and via stronger Chinese domestic demand growth. Since the GFC, Chinese exports have held a fairly steady share rather than continuing to make gains (Exhibit 8). This could reflect the exhaustion of benefits from WTO access, the gradual erosion of (productivity-adjusted) labor cost advantages, or simply the relative difficulty of gaining share in slower-growing markets. The headwinds to Chinese export growth have been somewhat obscured by data issues surrounding potential mis-invoicing of exports; trading partner data suggests that growth has been in the low single digits (Exhibit 9). Exhibit 8: China gained market share rapidly from WTO entry until the GFC Exhibit 9: Chinese export growth now appears to be in the low single digits Source: Haver, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Note: Major trading partners include the G-3, ASEAN (Philippines excluded), Korea, India, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Source: CEIC, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 95969798990001020304050607080910111213 Share of imports from China: USEUJapan Percent Percent China entered WTO -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 20062007200820092010201120122013 China reported exports to major trading partners Major trading partners' reported imports from China Percent, Year-over-Year Percent, Year-over-Year 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究8 Although the rest of emerging Asia actually lost market share on net in DM (Exhibit 10), these economies had large and fairly steady export shares to China, and so all “piggybacked” on Chinese growth to some extent. First, nearly half of Chinese imports were used in reprocessing trade, the bulk of which probably ended up in DM (about two-thirds of China’s exports go to DM). If we adjust for this indirect boost to exports from other AEJ countries, the rest of the region would have maintained a broadly steady share of DM markets. Second, the export boom fueled faster investment and domestic demand growth in China as well, which indirectly benefited other countries in the region. Total exports to China accounted for about a quarter of all export growth for the other AEJ countries in the decade leading up to the GFC. Exhibit 10: China more than accounted for AEJ export gains in DM Source: IMF, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. These market share gains made a major contribution to Chinese growth. Referring to Exhibit 10, the share of exports in DM rose by more than 0.5ppt/year in the early 2000s, from a base of around 5%-6%. In other words, exports to DM were growing by 10 ppt or more in excess of the underlying growth in the market (this is also visible in the pre-GFC years in Exhibit 9). These export share gains alone contributed 1-2ppt to Chinese real GDP growth, not including obvious spillover effects into domestic investment to build export capacity. The US and Japan were the two largest economies that lost share over this period, though as noted previously (Exhibit 5) they may have gained relative competitiveness recently. We also note that terms of trade (the relative prices of exports and imports) are not a major issue in these share shifts—almost all the countries we’re comparing here are energy/commodity importers. Better exports for now—but growth could be more work later Our expectations for DM growth, alongside the examination above of export trends in the region, suggest the following conclusions: 1. Exports are likely to make a larger contribution to emerging Asian growth in 2014, as DM growth—particularly US growth—picks up. The direct effects should be worth about 30bp for China, and up to 70bp elsewhere. Other things equal, the direct contribution from stronger exports could be magnified by positive income and investment effects domestically. However, slower growth in some EM countries will be a (partial) offset. 2. But the potential for exports (especially to DM) to drive emerging Asian growth is structurally declining. In the long term, even on optimistic assumptions, DM are likely to 4 9 14 19 24 4 9 14 19 24 95979901030507091113 AEJ AEJ ex-China China Percent of G-10 imports Percent of G-10 imports 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究9 grow a little slower than before the GFC, and that growth may be less import-intensive on the margin. Its own challenges notwithstanding, emerging Asia is thus likely to continue to grow faster, reducing the potential growth benefit from exports to DM (per Exhibits 6 and 7). Over the longer term, exports to other EMs should continue to gain importance relative to exports to the developed world. 3. This emphasizes the role of competitiveness via productivity gains… Gaining market share is possible but requires moving up the productivity ladder (China is seeing some success with this in higher-value added areas; see EMMacro Daily - Chinese exporters are upgrading, but grappling with fast rising labor cost, July 18,2013), and doing so more quickly than cost increases are eroding competitiveness in lower-value added areas. Aggregate market share gains are likely to be harder for countries that already have very large market shares (see Asia Economics Analyst: 13/42 - China: Less decoupling, more synchronization with the global economy, November 15,2013) or have moved far up the value-added ladder already. Smaller economies in the region with good policies may see world market share gains with good policies, but won’t have nearly the same magnitude of spillover effects China did in recent years. Of course, devaluations can rapidly improve competitiveness—and indeed have done so in India and Indonesia over the past year—but represent a decline in domestic purchasing power and living standards, other things equal. 4. …and efforts to boost domestic demand growth in a sustainable manner. To the extent that individual economies in the region and emerging Asia as a whole grow larger as a share of the world economy, and developed export markets slow, policies to generate sustained domestic demand growth will become a relatively more important part of the development strategy. Some of the reforms mooted at China’s Third Plenum could be important steps in this direction (see Asia in Focus: China’s third plenum: Sweeping changes unveiled in ambitious reform agenda, November 18,2013), but there is more room for progress in this area, both in China and throughout the region. Andrew Tilton, Jonathan Sequeira 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究10 Regional recap: Forecasting slower growth in China; improving trade balances in ASEAN We have marked down our first-half forecasts for Chinese GDP growth, reflecting a variety of external and domestic factors. China manufacturing deceleration continues into January; adjusting H1 forecasts We've marked down our forecasts for China's GDP growth modestly in the first half of 2014 (Exhibit 1), reflecting a combination of slowing domestic growth momentum (Exhibit 2) amid the strengthening of measures to combat corruption and pollution, a relatively tight monetary policy stance in late 2013, and a slightly softer US recovery now expected on the back of slower inventory accumulation. We project sequential growth of 6.7% (qoq annualized) and 7.3% in Q1 and Q2 respectively, down from 7.5% for both quarters. Sequential growth in Q3 is marked up to 7.7% (from 7.5%), supported by the momentum of export growth; consumption growth may also normalize somewhat after the latest round of anti-corruption measures. We now expect growth of 7.6% for 2014 a whole, compared to 7.8% before. We maintain our forecast of further deceleration of M2 and total social financing (TSF) to 13% and 15% respectively (yoy basis) by end-2014. On its own, the recent focus on trust financing may imply tightening of financial conditions (as the risk-adjusted returns on these products fall), but the impact is likely small and partly offset in the near term by the recent moderation of interbank rates. Exhibit 1: Adjusting our Chinese growth forecasts Source: CEIC, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Exhibit 11: Deceleration in manufacturing PMIs continued in January Source: Haver. Real GDP growth (%) New Forecast 20132014 Mar-14 Jun-14 Sep-14 Dec-14 yoy 7.77.67.77.97.57.4 qoq ann.6.77.37.77.8 Old Forecast yoy 7.77.87.98.27.77.6 qoq ann.7.57.57.57.8 QuarterlyAnnual 35 40 45 50 55 60 35 40 45 50 55 60 05060708091011121314 HSBC/MarkitPMI OfficialPMI Index Index 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究11 Exports encouraging in ASEAN, in line in Korea Exports from both Indonesia and Thailand surprised to the upside (Exhibit 3 shows three-month moving averages). Trade balances continued to improve as export growth was stronger than expected and imports declined from the levels seen the previous year. Indonesian exports grew 10.3% yoy in December up from -2.3% yoy in November. The trade balance remained in surplus for a third month, improving to US$1.5bn from US$0.8bn the previous month. Bloomberg consensus expectations were for a surplus of US$0.7 bn. As a consequence of this improvement in the trade balance, Q4 real GDP growth was faster than expected at 5.7% yoy vs. a median forecast of 5.3% yoy. Thailand too continued to show some improvement in its trade balances. which came in at US$2.5bn surplus on a balance of payments basis. Exports were up slightly (1.9%) while imports were down nearly 10% versus a year ago, reflecting the extremely weak domestic demand over the period. For the quarter as a whole, the (seasonally adjusted) current account surplus was nearly Bt100bn (US$3.2bn), or more than 3% of GDP. Leaving aside effects of the floods in late 2011, this would be the best result since early 2010, and is well-timed given the more difficult environment for capital flows to the region. Exhibit 12: Trade improvement in ASEAN Source: Haver. Korean exports fell in January 2014 by 0.2% yoy, broadly in line with Bloomberg consensus of an increase of 1.5% yoy. Exports excluding ships—a better proxy for current global demand for Korean goods given long order-delivery gaps for ship exports—were flat. Distortions related to a large overseas shift of handset production, evident in 2012 and 2013, have largely dissipated, in our view. On a sequential seasonally-adjusted basis, exports were up 1.4% mom, although noise related to the Lunar New Year holidays seem to have suppressed the sequential momentum. Imports were down 0.9% yoy and the trade surplus fell to US$0.7bn from US$3.7bn in December mostly on weak seasonality. In preliminary data released by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, exports to the EU and ASEAN were strong while exports to the US, China, and Japan were weak. Exports to the EU and ASEAN rose 24.7% yoy and 9.9% yoy, mostly on handsets and oil products, respectively. Exports to the US and Japan were down 2.0% yoy and 19.8% yoy, respectively, with the latter explained by a weak yen. Exports of most tech goods remained strong while exports of machinery, oil products, and LCD were soft. Exports of auto and auto parts were also weak (- 1.1% yoy and +0.3% yoy, respectively) partly on labor disputes as well as low working days. -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 200620072008200920102011201220132014 Indonesia Thailand Percent of GDP (3-month moving average) Trade balance (seasonally adjusted): Percent of GDP (3-month moving average) 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究12 January developments in Korea were broadly as we expected, with a modest export recovery, a falling trade surplus, and a weaker won. We continue to believe that tailwinds from the global recovery will help support Korean exports, as discussed in the previous section, although the recovery is likely to be moderate given yen depreciation and possible macro volatility in Asia arising from US tapering. Exhibit 13: Korea exports flat versus a year ago Source: Ministry of Knowledge and Economy. Inflation—higher in Taiwan and ASEAN Korea’s headline inflation remained low and in line with Bloomberg consensus at 1.1% yoy and unchanged from December—much lower than the Bank of Korea’s inflation target range of 2.5%- 3.5%. Core inflation has been falling since November, declining gradually from 2.0% yoy at that time to 1.7% yoy in January. Sequential increases in housing rental prices, public service fees (health, sewage and gas supply) and service charges (tourism and tutoring), most of which are seasonal, were mitigated by month-on-month declines in food and oil prices. Inflation expectations, as compiled by the Bank of Korea, remain high and sticky at 2.9% in January, unchanged from November. We expect inflation to remain benign at 2.2% for 2014 on average, much below the central bank’s target range, on weak global oil and agricultural food prices notwithstanding incremental rises in inflation in the coming months, mostly on the erosion of the low base effects and an economic recovery (see Asia Economics Analyst: 14/04 - Korea: Low inflation recovery bodes well for a rate cut, January 24,2014). In Thailand, headline inflation was higher than expected, coming in at 1.9% yoy, up from 1.6% yoy in December. Most of this increase came from food prices. As we have noted in previous commentary, low inflation in the first five months of 2013 (on a sequential, seasonally-adjusted basis) skews the risk modestly to the upside for year-over-year figures in the coming months. Core inflation also increased to 1.0% yoy from 0.9% yoy in December. Nonetheless, this remains clearly in the bottom half of the Bank of Thailand’s target range (0.5%-3.0%). Headline inflation also surprised to the upside in Taiwan and the Philippines. In Taiwan, headline inflation rose 0.8% yoy from 0.3% yoy the previous month but still remains quite low in an absolute sense. Inflation in the Philippines continued its uptrend since August, with headline inflation rising to 4.2% yoy when compared to the same month the previous year. In Indonesia, both core and headline inflation were softer than expected but remained at elevated levels. Headline prices increased to 8.2% yoy, from 8.1% yoy the previous month with the -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% -40% -20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Total exports Export exc. Ships Percent, year over year Percent, year over year Korea: Source: Ministry ofKnowledgeandEconomy. 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究13 sequential momentum hardening to 0.6% mom (in seasonally-adjusted terms). Core inflation has crept up steadily in previous months, rising to a two-year high of 5.0% yoy in December. We believe sequential inflation still faces upward pressure, although base effects from fuel price hikes in mid-2013 should translate to a more moderate headline yoy inflation in the second half of the year. Exhibit 14: Divergent inflation in emerging Asia Source: Haver, CEIC, Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Goohoon Kwon, Jonathan Sequeira, Andrew Tilton -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 20102011201220132014 Thailand Philippines South Korea Taiwan Indonesia CPI: Percent change, yoy Percent change, yoy 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究14 Asia ex-Japan Economics Calendar India trade balance (Feb 10-15): We expect the January trade deficit to come in at US$11.5bn, higher than the US$10.2bn in December. We expect export growth to slow somewhat as our Global Leading Indicator has slowed in January. Imports are likely to remain weak due to slowing domestic demand, as well as a decline in oil prices during the month. India CPI (Feb 12): We expect January CPI inflation to come in at 8.6% yoy, significantly below the 9.9% yoy in December. This is largely driven by a further decline in vegetable prices (-30%) in January. We expect core inflation to remain flat at 8.1% yoy. India industrial production (Feb 12): We expect December industrial production growth to remain weak at -1.1% yoy despite a modest pickup (+2.1% yoy) in infrastructure sector growth. For non-infrastructure industries, a majority of activity indicators such as non-oil imports, commercial vehicle sales and the manufacturing PMI suggest continued weakness in activity. Korea central bank policy meeting (Feb 13): We expect the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to keep the policy rate on hold again. We continue to believe that the MPC under new leadership since April will likely cut the policy rate in Q22014, on low inflation and moderate economic recovery. Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. Date Country Indicator/Event Period GSBloomberg Previous Time (HKT) Forecast Consensus Fri Feb 7 12:00 Malaysia Exports Dec +10.0% yoy +6.7% yoy 12:00 Malaysia Imports Dec +8.2% yoy +6.4% yoy 12:00 Malaysia Trade Balance Dec RM9.6bn RM9.7bn 15:30 Thailand Foreign Reserves 31-Jan US$167.2bn 18:00 Malaysia Foreign Reserves 30-Jan US$135bn # Philippines Foreign Reserves Jan US$83.2bn Mon Feb 10 12:00 Malaysia Industrial Production Dec +4.4% yoy 16:00 Taiwan Exports Jan +0.5% yoy -1.9% yoy 16:00 Taiwan Imports Jan -7.5% yoy +10.1% yoy 16:00 Taiwan Trade Balance Jan US$2.6bn US$1.4bn * China CNYLoans Jan +14.1% yoy * China Money Supply (M2) Jan +13.3% yoy +13.6% yoy * China Total Social Financing Jan Rmb1.97trn Rmb1.23trn * India Exports Jan +3.5% yoy * India Imports Jan -15.3% yoy * India Trade Balance Jan -US$11.5bn -US$10.2bn Tue Feb 11 9:00 Philippines Exports Dec +18.9% yoy Wed Feb 12 18:00 Malaysia GDPQ4 +5.1% yoy +5.0% yoy 20:00 India CPIJan +8.6% yoy +9.5% yoy +9.9% yoy 20:00 India Industrial Production Dec -1.1% yoy -1.0% yoy -2.1% yoy # China Exports Jan +0.8% yoy +4.3% yoy # China Imports Jan +4.5% yoy +8.3% yoy # China Trade Balance Jan US$22.3bn US$25.6bn Thu Feb 13 9:00 Korea Central Bank Policy Meeting 2.50% 2.50% 2.50% # Indonesia Central Bank Policy Meeting 7.75% 7.50% Fri Feb 14 9:30 China CPIJan +2.4% yoy +2.5% yoy 13:00 Singapore Retail Sales Dec -8.7% yoy 14:30 India Wholesale Price Index Jan +5.7% yoy +6.2% yoy 15:30 Thailand Foreign Reserves 7-Feb # Release time uncertain, time shown (if any) is the approximate typical release time. * Release date uncertain, date shown is the first possible day of release: China money and credit (Feb 10-15) India trade (Feb 10-15) 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究15 Forecast Tables Real GDPGrowth (year-over-year) GSConsensus GSConsensus Asia ex-Japan 6.36.36.26.7 - China 7.77.67.57.87.4 India 4.4** 5.5** 5.4** 6.5** - South Korea 2.83.73.63.83.7 Hong Kong 3.23.73.54.43.6 Taiwan 2.43.83.33.93.8 ASEAN 4.94.94.95.55.3 Singapore 3.23.83.84.24.0 Malaysia 4.75.05.15.25.0 Thailand 3.03.63.64.74.6 Indonesia 5.85.55.46.05.8 Philippines 7.06.36.36.56.2 USA 1.93.12.83.23.0 Euro area -0.41.21.01.51.4 Japan 1.71.41.71.21.2 *GS estimates for annualized growth rate of potential output from 2013-16 **Fiscal year basis,2013 is India FY14 (Q22013-Q12014). Source: Consensus Economics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. 201320142015 Potential Growth* 7.7 6.0 3.8 4.0 3.7 4.0 5.0 4.5 6.0 6.0 2.3 1.1 0.8 Consumer Prices (year-over-year) GSConsensus GSConsensus Asia ex-Japan 3.23.83.73.8 - China 2.63.03.13.03.3 India 6.4* 6.3* 5.9* 6.5* - South Korea 1.22.22.12.62.6 Hong Kong 4.03.33.83.33.6 Taiwan 0.81.41.41.81.8 ASEAN 4.34.54.34.04.0 Singapore 3.03.33.03.52.8 Malaysia 2.33.03.12.63.4 Thailand 2.22.62.42.92.8 Indonesia 7.06.86.25.55.3 Philippines 3.23.84.03.53.9 USA 1.51.71.61.91.9 Euro area 1.41.11.11.61.4 Japan 0.22.32.41.71.6 *WPI for India on fiscal year basis,2013 is India FY14 (Q22013-Q12014); inflation objective rather than target **Core inflation target ***ECB aims to maintain inflation rates "below, but close to,2% over the medium term" Source: Consensus Economics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. - 20132014 2.0 2.5-3.5 - 3.0-5.0 2.0 2.0*** 2015 Inflation Target/Range 3.5 5.0* - - 0.5-3.0 ** 3.5-5.5 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究16 Forecast Tables (continued) Policy Interest Rates (percent) Current Feb 61Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q Asia ex-Japan China 5.104.004.004.254.254.504.504.504.50 India 8.008.008.508.508.508.508.508.258.00 South Korea 2.502.502.252.252.252.502.752.753.00 Hong Kong - - - - - - - - - Taiwan 1.91.91.92.02.02.02.12.32.3 ASEAN Singapore - - - - - - - - - Malaysia 3.003.003.003.253.503.503.503.503.50 Thailand 2.252.002.002.002.002.502.752.752.75 Indonesia 7.507.757.757.757.757.256.756.756.75 Philippines 3.503.503.754.004.004.004.004.004.00 USA 0.070.130.130.130.130.130.130.130.13 Euro area 0.250.250.250.250.250.250.250.500.50 Japan 0.080.100.100.100.100.100.100.100.10 Policy interest rates: China: 7-day repo, India: repo rate; Korea: 7-day repo; Malaysia: overnight policy rate; Thailand: 1-day repo, Philippines: repo rate, Indonesia: 1-month SBI rate, Taiwan: rediscount rate; USA: Fed funds effective rate; Euro Area: Main refinancing operations: fixed rate; Japan: Overnight call rate. Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. 2014F 2015F Exchange Rates (local currency units per USD) Current 3-Month Horizon 6-Month Horizon 12-Month Horizon Feb 6 Forward Forecast Forward Forecast Forward Forecast Asia ex-Japan China 6.116.116.106.116.086.136.05 India 62.5163.8962.0065.2464.0067.7865.00 South Korea 1083108810801093108010991100 Hong Kong 7.87.87.87.87.87.87.8 Taiwan 30.430.229.830.229.530.129.0 ASEAN Singapore 1.281.281.201.281.181.281.15 Malaysia 3.343.363.183.383.173.413.15 Thailand 33.033.432.533.733.034.133.0 Indonesia 12130124001200012650119001315011800 Philippines 45.345.542.345.641.245.840.0 Euro area* 1.351.351.381.351.401.351.40 Japan 102.3102.3103.0102.2107.0102.0110.0 * USD per Euro Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究17 Highlights of Recent Goldman Sachs Global Macro Research Asia ex Japan Questions for the 2014 Asia-Pacific economics outlook Jan 3,2014 Diverging fortunes—the emerging Asia outlook for 2014 Nov 21,2013 Asian current accounts could adjust faster than you might think Oct 31,2013 Tooling up to analyze the Asian economies Oct 24,2013 How emerging Asia reacts to higher US yields Sep 13,2013 A deep dive into regional financial flows: Possible impact of USFed tapering Sep 6,2013 Cyclicality of Asian financial markets—seen from our Global Leading Indicator Jun 3,2013 A redesigned MAP of emerging Asia data May 10,2013 Greater China A look at CNH flows via Hong Kong banks’ positions data Feb 5,2014 China: Cleaner and (probably) slower growth Feb 3,2014 A matter of trust: Q&A on a potential Chinese trust default Jan 21,2014 Tracking reforms in China: The balancing act of a credit slowdown Jan 13,2014 China: Gaining fewer pounds—improving exports allow for slower leverage growth Jan 10,2014 China: RMB internationalization to power ahead Dec 11,2013 China outlook for 2014 and beyond: Steady drive on a bumpier road Dec 6,2013 Transmission of interbank interest rates in China: Limited on bank loan rates Nov 25,2013 How will financial reforms affect China’s risk-free rates Nov 8,2013 The China credit conundrum: Risks, paths and implications Jul 26,2013 Korea Korea: Low inflation recovery bodes well for a rate cut Jan 24,2014 Korea: Changes in our view—rate cut possibly this Thursday Jan 6,2014 Korea: Less FX appreciation, more equity strength and a steeper curve Nov 15,2013 Korea: Near-term outlook for the balance of payments and the KRWOct 24,2013 Korea: Growth upgrade on improving global demand and investment pickups Oct 4,2013 Korea’s current account—headed for a 14-year-high surplus of 5% of GDP this year Sep 4,2013 India India—a step forward for the RBI’s policy framework Jan 27,2014 India: Structural reforms—a look back at 2013, and future prospects Dec 16,2013 India 2014 outlook: Focus on inflation, investment, and elections Nov 28,2013 India: What are the different measures of inflation saying Nov 7,2013 A primer on India’s 2014 elections Oct 18,2013 India - What are the policy options Aug 26,2013 ASEAN Thailand’s political turmoil and its economic consequences Jan 16,2014 Modeling the probability of Bank Indonesia’s next hike Dec 9,2013 Indonesia: The path to sustainability is still fraught with risks Oct 4,2013 ASEAN markets roiled—where do we go from here Aug 22,2013 Indianesia—elevated vulnerability in the rupee and rupiah Jul 16,2013 ASEAN’s half a trillion dollar infrastructure opportunity May 30,2013 Japan (this section is provided by our Japan Economics team based in Tokyo) Japan: Watch for the large gap between ‘Shunto’ wage hikes and macro basic wage growth Jan 24,2014 Japan: 2014 critical for Abenomics: Watch wages, exports, Cabinet approval ratings Jan 10,2014 Income outflows from Japan due to worsening terms of trade, a cause of sluggish wages Dec 6,2013 FY2014 Japanese economy: Nominal wages and foreign demand are key Nov 21,2013 'Visit Japan' project has strong potential but unlikely to be a decisive growth engine Nov 13,2013 2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究18 信息披露附录 分析师申明 本人,Goohoon Kwon, CFA,在此申明,本报告所表述的所有观点准确反映了本人对上述公司或其证券的个人看法。

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2014年2月7日 亚洲经济分析 全球投资研究19 本报告中署名的分析师可能已经与包括高华证券销售人员和交易员在内的我们的客户讨论,或在本报告中讨论交易策略,其中提及可能会对本报告讨论的证券 市场价格产生短期影响的推动因素或事件,该影响在方向上可能与分析师发布的股票目标价格相反。

任何此类交易策略都区别于且不影响分析师对于该股的基 本评级,此类评级反映了某只股票相对于报告中描述的研究范围内股票的回报潜力。

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在任何要约出售股票或征求购买股票要约的行为为非法的地区,本报告不构成该等出售要约或征求购买要约。

本报告不构成个人投资建议,也没有考虑到个别 客户特殊的投资目标、财务状况或需求。

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本报告 中提及的投资价格和价值以及这些投资带来的收入可能会波动。

过去的表现并不代表未来的表现,未来的回报也无法保证,投资者可能会损失本金。

外汇汇率 波动有可能对某些投资的价值或价格或来自这一投资的收入产生不良影响。

某些交易,包括牵涉期货、期权和其它衍生工具的交易,有很大的风险,因此并不适合所有投资者。

投资者可以向高华销售代表取得或通过 取得当前的期权披露文件。

对于包含多重期权买卖的期权策略结构产品,例如,期权差价结构产 品,其交易成本可能较高。

与交易相关的文件将根据要求提供。

北京高华证券有限责任公司版权所有 2014年 未经北京高华证券有限责任公司事先书面同意,本材料的任何部分均不得(i)以任何方式制作任何形式的拷贝、复印件或复制品,或(ii)再次分发。

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