当前位置:首页 > 研报详细页

银行业研究报告:高华证券-银行业:同业市场(七),T+0货币市场基金的快速增长可能加大系统流动性风险(摘要)-140129

研报作者:马宁,李南 来自:高华证券 时间:2014-01-30 09:26:01
  • 股票名称
    银行业
  • 股票代码
  • 研报类型
    (PDF)
  • 发布者
    wa***bo
  • 研报出处
    高华证券
  • 研报页数
    26 页
  • 推荐评级
  • 研报大小
    881 KB
研究报告内容

2014年1月29日 中国:银行 证券研究报告 同业市场(七):T+0货币市场基金的快速增长可能加大系统流动性风险(摘要) 中国货币市场基金从低基数水平快速增长 中国货币市场基金(货基)2013年资产管理规模增至 人民币8,830亿元,较之2010年的低基数水平,三年 来的年均复合增长率高达79%,这主要因为通过网络/ 移动渠道销售的可实现T+0取现/支付功能的高收益货 基异军突起。

T+0货基与活期存款相似,但收益率更高 中国T+0货基既具备活期存款的支付/转账便利,又能 提供5-7%的收益率。

虽然银行理财产品或许能在收益 率上与T+0货基竞争,但由于不能提前支取而无法阻 止银行存款流出至T+0货基。

由于美国的货基可以提 供T+0和支票开具功能,其资产管理规模与存款之比 高达28%;而不支持T+0的英国本土/日本/台湾货基 的资产管理规模与存款之比相对较小。

可能出现存款外流的恶性循环 随着更多存款外流至主要投资于同业存款的T+0货 基,银行可能会被迫提高存款利率以满足贷存比要 求,进而推动同业利率(SHIBOR)上升并导致更多存款 外流。

*全文翻译随后提供 随着T+0货基壮大,流动性风险上升 我们认为随着T+0货基增长,它们可能面临更大的流 动性风险,因为它们需要通过同业市场拆借来满足净 赎回要求。

一旦发生意外的大规模赎回或者货基净值 下降则可能触发基金赎回,或许会出现类似2008年美 国货基遭“挤兑”的局面。

在那场危机之后,许多国 家都出台了更严格的监管要求,以解决货基的流动性 和资产结构问题。

我们认为,由于中国货基具备T+0 功能且监管相对较松,所以可能在中长期内面临更大 的流动性风险。

在监管机构采取行动之前,看好优质银行股 我们认为T+0货基的快速增长可能推高银行和企业的 资金成本,并加大系统性贷存比/流动性风险,其程度 或许会较美国70-90年代时更甚,因为中国银行业受 制于贷存比要求而且针对货基的监管相对较松。

在银 行业贷存比要求以及货基流动性/资产结构问题得到解 决之前,中国银行业可能面临长期的净息差/净资产回 报率压力。

我们看好存款业务具备防御能力的银行, 包括农业银行H/A股(买入/强力买入)以及招商银行 H/A股(强力买入/买入)。

主要政策风险:政策不调 整;GDP增速硬着陆。

恶性循环:银行存款大量流入T+0货基会加剧存款竞争、推 动同业利率和货基收益率上升,进而导致更多存款外流 资料来源:高盛全球投资研究 相关研究 中国:银行:同业利率高企将持续更长时间;在充满挑战的2014 年首选优质银行股;选择性买入;2014年1月23日 马宁 (分析师) 执业证书编号: S1420510120014 +86(10)6627-3063 ning.ma@ghsl.cn北京高华证券有限责任公司 北京高华证券有限责任公司及其关联机构与其研究报告所分析的企业存在业 务关系,并且继续寻求发展这些关系。

因此,投资者应当考虑到本公司可能 存在可能影响本报告客观性的利益冲突,不应视本报告为作出投资决策的唯 一因素。

有关分析师的申明和其他重要信息,见信息披露附录,或请与您的 投资代表联系。

李南, CFA (分析师) 执业证书编号: S1420513110001 +86(10)6627-3021 nan.li@ghsl.cn北京高华证券有限责任公司 吴双 (研究助理) +86(10)6627-3487 jessica.wu@ghsl.cn北京高华证券有限责任公司 北京高华证券有限责任公司 投资研究 Interbank negotiable deposits Deposit rate rise Interbank rate rise LDR increase More deposits flowing to MMF Demand deposits MMF 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究2 Overview: Rapid T+0 money market funds growth may increase system liquidity risk China money market funds (MMFs) have been growing rapidly, posting a three-year CAGR of 79% to Rmb883bn AUM in 2013 from a low base in 2010. This has been driven largely by the emergence of MMF with the T+0 cash transfer/payment function in the internet and mobile direct distribution channel, offering 5% to7% yields. The T+0 function allows investors to request/redeem funds on the same business day, and enables the use of MMF to pay credit cards, mortgages, etc. We believe T+0 MMF is similar to demand deposits at commercial banks in terms of cash convenience but offer higher returns. Bank wealth management products (WMPs), which have been effective in competing with MMF without T+0 functions, cannot prevent deposits from flowing to T+0 MMFs given the cash and payment convenience. In the US, MMFs reached 28% of deposits in 2012 thanks to T+0 and check writing functions, while MMFs from UK onshore/Japan/Taiwan are relatively small vs. deposits as they do not support local MMFs with T+0. We see two key risks for the banking sector from MMFs offering T+0 cash transfer/payment functions: 1) Liquidity pressure on the banking system given the vicious deposit outflow cycle and China’s L/D ratio requirement: T+0 MMFs are attracting deposits away from banks, and China banks’ strict 75% L/D cap requirement may perpetuate a vicious cycle of deposit outflows. As more deposits flow out of banks, banks have to raise deposit rates to attract deposits to meet the L/D requirement, thus pushing up the yields of interbank assets and MMFs and, in turn, creating more fund outflow. Thus, continued rapid growth of T+0 MMF could increase banks’ L/D pressure, funding costs and corporate funding costs, unless China strengthens regulations on MMFs and/or eliminates the 75% L/D requirement, in our view. 2) MMFs may face liquidity risks if their AUMs become bigger: Since most debt securities or interbank lending can’t be settled on a “same-day” basis, fund managers need to meet cash withdrawals with their own capital or money borrowed from banks on T+0 day and liquidate corresponding MMF shares on T+1 day. Thus, if MMFs grow too big, they may need to borrow large amounts from banks on particular days, potentially creating liquidity risks or forcing money transfer halts if redemption levels are too high. If an MMF faces an unexpected large redemption or sees its NAV decline amid rate hikes or bond defaults, this could trigger significant withdrawals or a run similar to what happened in the US in 2008. Post crisis, many countries have tightened regulations on MMF liquidity and asset mix. We believe China MMFs could be more exposed to liquidity risks longer term, given the practice of using their own capital/bank loans to fund T+0, and fewer regulations on liquidity. Progress hinges on regulatory moves to address L/D requirement & T+0 MMF; we prefer quality banks Although China’s T+0 MMFs offer better returns than short-term deposits for clients, we believe continued rapid T+0 MMF growth may raise funding costs and system L/D and liquidity risks for banks and corporates in the medium to long term, potentially to more severe levels than seen in the US during the 1970s-1990s given China banks’ L/D requirement and fewer regulations on MMFs’ T+0 function and asset mix. We believe China banks will face long-term NIM/ROE pressure until regulators move to address these issues. We prefer banks with defensive deposit franchises, including our Buy-rated names ABCH/A (on our Conviction List) and CMBH (CL)/A, ABC H/CMBA, ICBC/CCBH/A. We believe the negative impact from T+0 MMF will be felt mainly on retail demand deposits at this point. This impact is small but growing, with MMFs totaling c.Rmb900bn vs. Rmb18 tn retail demand deposits and Rmb46.5 tn retail deposits in FY13. 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究3 How T+0 MMF affects each bank will depend on the size of the retail demand deposits and the retail customer base, and how sophisticated their retail customers are. Exhibit 1 outlines the amount of each banks’ retail deposits as % of total deposits. We highlight the following points: Big banks (ICBC, CCB, BOC, ABC), CMB and CQRCB have strong retail demand deposits base, and could thus be more vulnerable to the rise of demand deposit outflows in the longer term, in theory. That said, we believe ABC and CQRCB could be more defensive against MMF impacts, as significant parts of their customer base are rural/county or are less financially sophisticated than urban customers in terms of taking up online T+0 MMF product offerings. Moreover, both banks have low L/D ratios and should benefit from high interbank rates for their interbank lending business, in our view. Exhibit 2 outlines the impact of a 2% RMB demand deposit shift to T+0 MMF in 2014E (equivalent to c.Rmb700bn). Reducing the pressure of the demand deposit outflow somewhat, we forecast a further Rmb300bn of non-principal guaranteed WMP in 2014. Overall, we assume T+0 MMF will increase by c. Rmb1tn to Rmb1.9tn in 2014E (vs. c. Rmb27bn mom increase in Jan 2014). The earnings impact from the demand deposit outflow is modest at an average of 1.3% for listed banks in 2014E (2bps cut in NIM), without much differentiation among banks. The negative impact is largely reflected in our current earnings estimates (7bps NIM contraction in 2014). But as the magnitude of potential outflow increases in the long run, we think the earnings impact on banks could become more substantial if more comprehensive regulations are not introduced. We will monitor downside risks to earnings from the following areas closely: Overall size of T+0 MMFs’ AUM; Timing/potential for corporates/SMEs to be allowed to invest in T+0 MMFs, which would increase demand for improved liquidity management for MMFs and the whole banking system; and Potential regulatory changes. 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究4 Exhibit 1: Big banks (ICBC, CCB, ABC, BOC), CMB and CQRCB have strong retail demand deposits bases, and could thus be more vulnerable to the rise of T+0 MMF in the longer term Exhibit 2: A 2% Rmb demand deposit shift from banks to MMFs in 2014 would drive c.1.3% average 2014ENPAT impact Note: We assume the proportion of demand deposit outflow at ABC/CQRCB is only two-thirds the sector proportion of 2% given their higher exposure to rural/county customers. 资料来源:Company data, Gao Hua Securities Research 资料来源:Company data, Gao Hua Securities Research 1H13, Rmb mn Retaildemand %totaldeposits Retaildemand %demand deposits ICBC 21% 43% BOC 18% 41% CCB 19% 38% ABC 28% 54% BoCom 12% 28% CMB 21% 41% CNCB 4% 11% SPDB 4% 13% Industrial 8% 20% Minsheng 6% 17% PAB 7% 24% HuaXia 6% 15% BONB 7% 18% BOBJ 5% 11% BONJ 6% 15% CEB 12% 33% CQRCB 20% 47% BOCQ 7% 17% Average 18% 39% Equivalent Deposits Impact impacts costs on NIM in 2014E on 2014E (bp) (bp) NPAT ICBC 3.4 -2.6 -1.5% BOC 2.9 -1.9 -1.2% CCB 3.3 -2.7 -1.5% ABC 2.5 -2.1 -1.3% BoCom 2.8 -1.9 -1.3% CMB 3.4 -2.3 -1.2% CNCB 3.1 -2.2 -1.6% SPDB 2.3 -1.6 -1.1% CEB 2.7 -1.8 -1.3% Industrial 2.6 -1.6 -0.9% Minsheng 2.9 -1.9 -1.1% SZDB 3.2 -2.3 -1.8% Huaxia 3.0 -2.2 -1.9% BONB 2.8 -1.6 -1.1% BONJ 2.5 -1.5 -1.2% BOBJ 3.1 -2.0 -1.5% CQRCB 2.0 -1.5 -1.0% BOCQ 2.6 -2.0 -1.2% Average 2.8 -2.0 -1.3% 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究5 Exhibit 3: China banks valuation comp table * denotes the stock is on our regional Conviction List. 资料来源:Datastream, Gao Hua Securities Research 28-Jan Mkt Cap 12MPotential H-shares (HKD) Rating Price (US$ bn) TargetPrice Upside/ downside 2013E 2014E 2015E 2013E 2014E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2013E 2014E 2015E ICBC (H) 1398.HKBuy 4.67 2106.5039% 1.000.870.761.090.935.0 4.5 4.0 3.4 3.1 2.8 7.07.88.79.1 10.4 12.1 21.5 20.7 20.1 BOC (H) 3988.HKNeutral 3.25 1173.8017% 0.780.700.630.860.774.7 4.3 3.9 3.1 2.9 2.6 7.48.18.99.4 9.0 9.8 17.4 17.0 16.7 CCB (H) 0939.HKBuy 5.28 1707.0033% 0.970.840.731.010.874.9 4.4 4.0 3.3 2.9 2.6 7.17.97.910.310.812.219.5 18.8 18.4 ABC (H) 1288.HKBuy 3.33 1394.6038% 0.990.890.780.990.885.1 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 6.97.88.716.113.112.020.820.820.6 BoCom (H) 3328.HKSell 5.02 485.408% 0.730.650.580.820.714.7 4.2 3.9 2.9 2.6 2.4 4.55.05.59.1 9.9 8.7 16.1 16.1 15.6 CMB (H) 3968.HKBuy* 13.62 4420.1048% 1.010.870.741.070.915.4 4.7 4.2 3.6 3.1 2.7 4.95.25.9 -3.913.513.621.6 19.7 19.2 CNCB (H) 0998.HKNeutral 3.76 234.9030% 0.630.550.490.710.653.9 3.4 3.1 2.2 2.0 1.8 6.57.38.015.312.99.117.0 16.1 15.6 Minsheng (H) 1988.HKBuy 7.53 2810.5039% 0.870.740.620.920.814.0 3.6 3.1 2.6 2.3 2.0 5.56.88.18.39.517.823.1 21.4 21.4 CQRCB 3618.HKNeutral 3.33 44.4032% 0.660.590.520.720.664.1 3.7 3.3 2.7 2.5 2.1 7.38.09.014.49.911.817.5 16.9 16.7 BOCQ 1963.HKNeutral 4.92 26.1024% 0.780.670.570.880.734.5 3.8 3.3 3.1 2.5 2.2 4.45.26.0 -8.518.415.521.4 18.8 18.6 H-share average 0.840.740.640.910.794.7 4.2 3.8 3.1 2.8 2.5 6.16.97.79.211.211.919.6 18.8 18.5 A-shares (Rmb) ICBC (A) 601398.SSBuy 3.39 1965.2053% 0.920.800.690.990.854.6 4.1 3.7 3.12.82.57.78.59.59.110.412.121.5 20.7 20.1 BOC (A) 601988.SSNeutral 2.49 1153.0020% 0.750.670.600.830.744.6 4.2 3.8 3.02.82.57.78.49.29.49.09.817.4 17.0 16.7 CCB (A) 601939.SSBuy 3.93 1625.6042% 0.900.790.690.950.824.6 4.2 3.7 3.02.72.47.68.48.410.310.812.219.5 18.8 18.4 ABC (A) 601288.SSBuy* 2.37 1273.6052% 0.890.800.690.880.794.6 4.0 3.6 3.22.82.67.78.79.716.113.112.020.8 20.8 20.6 BoCom (A) 601328.SSNeutral 3.80 474.3013% 0.690.620.550.780.684.4 4.0 3.7 2.82.52.36.26.87.59.1 9.9 8.7 16.1 16.1 15.6 CMB (A) 600036.SSBuy 10.44 4416.0053% 0.970.840.721.030.885.2 4.6 4.0 3.53.02.65.05.46.1 -3.913.513.621.6 19.7 19.2 CNCB (A) 601998.SSNeutral 3.69 293.906% 0.780.680.600.880.814.8 4.2 3.9 2.82.52.25.25.96.515.312.99.117.0 16.1 15.6 Minsheng (A) 600016.SSNeutral 7.19 348.4017% 1.050.890.751.110.974.8 4.4 3.7 3.12.82.44.65.66.88.39.517.823.1 21.4 21.4 SPDB 600000.SSNeutral 9.19 2811.0020% 0.840.700.600.940.824.1 3.8 3.5 2.62.42.33.84.04.720.89.97.121.6 20.4 18.5 Industrial 601166.SSBuy 9.42 2512.5033% 0.910.760.641.090.924.3 3.6 3.1 2.52.12.04.55.76.611.8 18.3 17.5 22.9 23.0 22.5 PAB 000001.SZBuy 11.50 1815.1031% 0.950.830.721.241.096.2 5.9 4.8 4.63.73.61.61.72.012.95.222.616.6 16.2 16.1 Hua Xia 600015.SSSell 8.25 126.90 -16% 0.860.760.670.960.965.2 4.7 4.3 3.73.12.74.85.35.820.09.810.217.7 17.1 16.6 BONB 002142.SZNeutral 8.89 411.4028% 0.980.830.721.070.905.1 4.7 4.3 3.43.12.83.33.84.122.79.610.120.7 19.2 18.1 BOBJ 601169.SSNeutral 7.14 108.3016% 0.810.720.630.970.854.8 4.2 3.7 3.12.72.46.37.28.212.713.314.117.7 18.1 18.2 BONJ 601009.SSSell 7.97 48.000% 0.870.760.660.950.845.3 4.8 4.3 3.73.32.93.54.24.811.010.610.817.2 17.0 16.4 CEB 601818.SSSell 2.50 192.40 -4% 0.770.670.580.930.824.3 4.0 3.6 2.82.42.15.25.56.10.36.410.820.417.817.2 A-share average 0.870.760.660.980.864.84.33.93.22.82.55.35.96.611.610.812.419.518.718.2 Big banks average 0.870.760.670.910.804.64.13.73.12.82.57.78.59.211.210.811.519.819.319.0 Shareholding banks average 0.870.750.651.000.884.84.43.83.12.72.54.65.15.810.510.613.019.718.618.1 City Bank Average 0.890.770.671.000.865.14.64.13.43.02.74.45.15.715.511.211.718.518.117.6 P/B (X) EPS growth (%) ROE (%)P/E (X) P/PPOP (X) Div yield (%) Adj. P/B (X) 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究6 China MMFs see rapid growth off a low base The first MMF in China was introduced in 2003, but MMF products didn’t see dramatic growth until 2010. During 2010 and 2013, China MMFs’ AUM saw rapid growth with a three-year CAGR of 79% to Rmb883bn, from the low base of Rmb260bn in 2010, with a notable jump after 2Q13 as explained below. Exhibit 4: China MMFs’ AUM saw rapid growth with a three-year CAGR of 79% to Rmb883bn, from the low base of Rmb260bn in 2010, with a notable jump after 2Q13 资料来源:Wind, Gao Hua Securities Research We believe the main drivers of MMFs’ rapid growth in China after 2Q13 are: 1. The innovation of T+0 redemption via online channels for small withdrawals From Oct 2012, many mutual fund firms launched MMFs with T+0 redemption, cash transfer and payment features through their online direct distribution channels. This increased the convenience of MMFs significantly, and also increased their similarity with bank demand deposits. Since most debt securities or interbank lending can’t be settled on a “same-day” basis, fund managers meet cash withdrawals with their own capital or money borrowed from banks on T+0 day and liquidate corresponding MMF shares on T+1 day. The CSRC 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 Ja n -0 6 M ay -0 6 S ep -0 6 Ja n -0 7 M ay -0 7 S ep -0 7 Ja n -0 8 M ay -0 8 S ep -0 8 Ja n -0 9 M ay -0 9 S ep -0 9 Ja n -1 0 M ay -1 0 S ep -1 0 Ja n -1 1 M ay -1 1 S ep -1 1 Ja n -1 2 M ay -1 2 S ep -1 2 Ja n -1 3 M ay -1 3 S ep -1 3 Ja n -1 4 Money market fund AUMRmb bn 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究7 allows these T+0 products to be distributed by direct sales channels but not through bank distribution channels. This pushed MMF growth to accelerate in 2012. As at end-2013, the number of T+0 MMFs had reached 82. 2. Large and consistent return premium over demand deposits and 1-day notice deposits, due partly to the rate differential arbitrage between deposits and interbank deposits By investing in MMFs, investors can arbitrage the spread between the highly liberalized interbank market and regulated deposit rate. In Oct 2011, the CSRC removed the cap on MMF asset allocation to negotiable deposits with early withdrawal options. Correspondingly, fund managers have been able to better leverage the spread by allocating a large proportion (c.60%) of total assets to interbank lending, instead of bond investment, which is subject to mark-to-market valuation and volatility. As liquidity has been tight since 2H13, MMF yields have trended up in line with the interbank rate. In contrast, the yield ceiling of demand deposit /1- day notice deposits is only 0.385%/0.88%. 3. Internet as a powerful distribution channel Since June 2013, Alipay has promoted an MMF named “Yu’ebao” to its 800mn users. Yuebao’s AUM rose to over Rmb250bn from launch in seven months, gaining 28% of market share By linking to the platform of the No.1 online-payment service Alipay, this MMF includes many payment functions. In addition to T+0 redemption, it enables users to manage credit card repayment, online shopping, transfer money at no charge, consolidate all bank cards to one MMF, and access the online help desks of various commercial banks. The all-cards-in-one e-wallet feature, along with user-friendly website/mobile apps, helped this MMF to grow to 43mn clients,83% of which are aged between 18 and 35. Near term, e-channel/mobile banking could continue to support rapid MMF growth, in our view, due to: Continued high growth of smartphone users: upcoming 4G mobile networks could provide users with faster and more widespread access to mobile internet. Our GSTelecom team forecasts smartphone subscriptions will hit 1.1bn with a 60% CAGR in 2013E- 2015E and a penetration rate of c.80% by 2015E (Exhibit 5). Launch of more all-services-in-one e-wallets linked to MMF: following Alipay’s example, internet giants like Baidu and Tencent’s WeChat have started to distribute T+0 MMFs. Financial institutions like Ping An Group and Minsheng online bank are also planning to launch cash products linked to MMFs. These new entrants could bring MMFs to a broader range of potential clients. MMFs could offer comprehensive financial services in the future that are similar to commercial banking services but subject to far fewer regulations: if China regulators do not prevent T+0 MMFs from further innovation of products in line with existing banking products, we believe these MMFs could use the internet to continue to implement more functions, largely around payment functions. Banks, to a certain extent, face many strict regulatory limitations, such as L/D and reserve requirements, as well as their own complicated internal controls, and thus may not be able to compete effectively with new comparable products. We believe by combining the core T+0 cash transfer/payment function of MMFs with other features, MMFs could develop many products similar to banking products if regulators were to allow them to directly compete against banks. For instance, we believe MMF-linked e-wallets, like those of Alipay/Wechat/Ping An Group, could in the future create a marketplace of diversified financial products by: 1) inviting banks to offer services within their mobile 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究8 applications,2) supporting offline shopping payments to incorporate more merchants like shopping malls or hospitals, and 3) allowing investors to consolidate all their bank cards in one e-wallet and enable cash withdrawal directly from ATM, etc. Moreover, we believe e-wallets or mobile wallets could add more money transfer functions aimed at making micro-money transfers between individuals easier and more social. For example, WeChat users can do micro-money transfers via their WeChat accounts within several seconds instead of typing the long bank card numbers. Exhibit 5: GS forecasts smartphone subscriptions to reach 1.1bn in 2015E at a 60% 3YCAGR Exhibit 6: Mobile payment users surged to 79mn in 1H13, representing 104% annualized growth and c.4pp improvement of usage ratio, thanks to e- commerce growth, convenient/free fund transfers, etc. 资料来源:Company data, MIIT, Gao Hua Securities Research, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. 资料来源:CNNIC 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 20 13 E 20 14 E 20 15 E Smartphone penetration (RHS) Total smartphone subs(bn) 55.31 79.11 13.20% 17.10% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 0 30 60 90 120 150 20121H13 Mobile payment user (mn) Mobile payment usage ratio(RHS) 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究9 Exhibit 7: Without regulations similar to banks, T+0 MMFs could in future offer more comprehensive commercial banking services through the internet 资料来源:Gao Hua Securities Research Pay service fees (gas, hospital, etc.)Shopping Transactions with banks Apply for consumer loan Repay small loans from friends E- wallet (MMF) Send money to parents Receive funds from spouse Submit fees to daytrip organizer Split bills between friends Trust products Investment Redeem deposits at Bank B for ATM withdrawal Transactions with corporates Repay credit card at Bank A Bank WMPs Mutual funds Insurance products Acquaintance transactions 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究10 Exhibit 8: US consumers were the major investors in MMFs in the early days, but they have gradually gained popularity among corporates and other institutions MMF breakdown by investors in US 资料来源:USFederal Reserve, Gao Hua Securities Research MMF with T+0: Driving deposit outflows thanks to similarity to demand deposits MMFs with T+0 cash withdrawal and payment functions in China are similar to commercial banks’ demand deposits but offering higher returns. We believe they could see high growth in line with the US experience in the 1980s-1990s. The advantages of T+0 redemption include: Investors can convert MMFs to bank accounts within 30 minutes through online or mobile applications at no charge. Some MMFs, like that of China Asset Management Corp, support repayment of credit cards/bank loans. Yu’ebao provides the same shopping/payment/account transfer functions as Alipay. The limitations of current T+0 MMFs include: MMFs set the daily maximum T+0 redemption limit, ranging from roughly Rmb50k to Rmb5mn. T+0 redemption only applies to MMFs sold by direct channels via the internet. Most MMFs sold via bank channels or institutional sales still have T+2/T+1 schemes as neither IT systems nor self-owned capital could support a large number of redemption orders. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Others Funding corp(e.g. financial advisor) Pension/insurers Corporates Consumer 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究11 Instant withdrawal could be closed in some special periods like the pause of the bank settlement system at midnight. Redemption is funded by MMFs’ self-owned capital or overnight bank loans. If there are overwhelming withdrawal orders, self- owned capital or borrowing from banks might not be adequate and T+0 redemption could be halted. Nevertheless, overall we think current T+0 redemption and payment functions are similar to bank demand deposits. Exhibit 9 compares the features of MMFs in different countries. We believe China MMFs with T+0 functions most closely resemble USMMFs. We believe China T+0 MMFs may have strong growth potential, as current AUM represents only 3% of demand deposits in 2013. USMMFs’ AUM peaked at 91% of the commercial banking system’s non-time deposits in 2001 and declined to 37% by 2012 due to low interest rates (Exhibit 11). We believe the large AUM of USMMFs is partly because their strong cash accessibility is comparable to checking account deposits on T+0 redemption and free check-writing privileges (Exhibit 9). Conversely, UK-authorized MMFs (retail-focused and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority(FCA)cannot have T+0 functions, and thus have significantly lower AUM, equivalent to 0.2% of deposits, because the withdrawal period of many MMFs is four business days. In contrast, MMFs domiciled outside the UK (mostly institutional-focused) had a relatively high 17% of UK banking deposits in 2012, partly because some MMFs domiciled in Luxembourg and Ireland offer T+0 trading, which is appealing to institutional investors, though payment functions like check writing are seldom adopted. MMFs’ AUM in Japan/Taiwan are also small relative to deposits, partly because T+1 or longer withdrawal periods do not make them attractive as replacements for demand deposits. 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究12 Exhibit 9: USMMFs provide the highest cash convenience among countries within our coverage, while Taiwan, Japan and UK onshore MMFs typically do not support T+0 redemption Cash accessibility of typical MMFs in various countries/regions Note: 5/1 represents the strongest/weakest cash accessibility. 资料来源:Company data, Gao Hua Securities Research Exhibit 10: T+0 and cash accessibility are key determinants of MMF market size. Strong cash accessibility contributes to the large size of the USMMF industry while longer withdrawal waiting periods partly hinder MMFs in UK domestic markets, Japan and Taiwan MMF % as of customer deposits, China as of 2013 and others as of 2012 Note: Some MMFs in Taiwan are classified as bond mutual funds. 资料来源:CEIC, PBOC, Gao Hua Securities Research China MMFUSMMFUK-authorized MMF UKMMF domiciled outside UK (for institutional clients) Taiwan MMFJapan MMF Typical characteristics and cash accessibility T+0 (instant withdrawal) on any day with a daily limit range of Rmb50k to Rmb2mn. E-trade/phone redemption. Repay credit cards/online payment for some MMFs. Able to sweep cash and MMFs automatically. T+0 on any day. Free check writing. Associated debit/credit cards. E-trade/phone redemption. Able to sweep cash and MMFs automatically. T+4 working days Minimum balance: 500-1000 sterling E-trade/phone redemption T+0 (apply before noon, receive cash in the afternoon of working day). T+1 T+1/T+2 Minimum balance: NT$30,000 T+1 minimum 0.1% redemption fee if carry days less than 30 days Score 5, similar to demand deposits 5, similar to checking deposits 2322 0.9 28 0.2 17 0.3 4 0.002 China MMFUSMMFUK authorised MMFUK total MMF incl. funds domiclied outside UK Japan MMFTaiwan MMF&Bond funds Taiwan MMF 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究13 Exhibit 11: USMMFs were equivalent to 91% of non-time deposits in 2001, and declined to 37% in 2012 due to low interest rates Exhibit 12: We see potential for China MMFs to grow from the low base of only 3% of demand deposits in 2013 资料来源:USFederal Reserve, FDIC, Gao Hua Securities Research 资料来源:Wind, Gao Hua Securities Research 2. Deposits may continue to flow out of banks to T+0 MMFs if regulations do not change We believe rapid growth of MMF with T+0 functions will continue, unless China revisits its T+0 regulations, strengthen MMFs’ liquidity requirements, or removes the L/D ratio cap of 75% so that China banks would no longer need to raise deposit rates to comply due to deposit outflows. In addition to demand deposits, we believe bank WMPs also cannot compete with MMFT+0, as WMPs are fixed income products that do not allow early redemption. Therefore bank WMPs are only an effective tool against MMF without T+0 functions. Moreover, several banks have launched proprietary T+0 MMF products aimed at attracting new clients at the expense of rising funding costs. For instance, PAB has launched a T+0 MMF product to its e-banking clients and BoCOM has also promoted a T+0 MMF product via its branch channels. We believe this will further accelerate the growth of MMFs. The situation in China is similar to that of US banks during their deposit rate deregulation in the 1980s, when US banks tried to defend their deposits and control MMF expansion by launching MMDA (Money Market Deposit Accounts), of which return was linked to money markets. 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 19 75 19 77 19 79 19 81 19 83 19 85 19 87 19 89 19 91 19 93 19 95 19 97 19 99 20 01 20 03 20 05 20 07 20 09 20 11 USMMF as % of non-time deposits 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% Ja n !/ 11 M ar !/ 11 M ay !/ 11 Ju l! /1 1 S ep !/ 11 N o v! /1 1 Ja n !/ 12 M ar !/ 12 M ay !/ 12 Ju l! /1 2 S ep !/ 12 N o v! /1 2 Ja n !/ 13 M ar !/ 13 M ay !/ 13 Ju l! /1 3 S ep !/ 13 N o v! /1 3 China MMF as % of demand deposits ,% ,% 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究14 At first, MMDA yields were as high as MMFs’ (Exhibit 18). However, banks couldn’t afford such high funding cost and had to cut MMDA rates and thus MMDA ultimately failed to prevent deposits from flowing to MMFs. Instead, to maintain their clients and AUM, US banks had to launch proprietary MMFs, which accounted for about 32% of total MMFAUM in 2012. Exhibit 13: T+0 MMFs’ yields beat demand deposits in cash management segment. Despite higher returns, bank WMPs struggle to compete with T+0 MMFs as they don’t allow early redemption 资料来源:Wind, Gao Hua Securities Research Instant T+0 T+1 T+21W 3M 1Y 2Y 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 MMF Bank WMP Bank WMP Bank WMP Trust loan Maturity Demand deposits 1DNotice deposits Average yield range,% 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究15 Exhibit 14: China MMF returns are much higher than demand deposits and 1D notice deposits Exhibit 15: Similarly, higher yield spread between USMMFs and saving deposits attracted more net cash inflow to retail USMMFs in the 1990s Yield spread between retail MMFs and bank deposits and net cash flow to retail MMFs Note: MMF yield is based on the average return of the 82 MMFs with T+0 redemption up to now. Note: Abstract from the paper of Investment Company Institute published in July 2000, titled “The 1990s: A Decade of Expansion and Change in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry”. 资料来源:Wind, Gao Hua Securities Research 资料来源:ICI 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Ja n -1 0 M ar -1 0 M ay -1 0 Ju l- 10 S ep -1 0 N o v- 10 Ja n -1 1 M ar -1 1 M ay -1 1 Ju l- 11 S ep -1 1 N o v- 11 Ja n -1 2 M ar -1 2 M ay -1 2 Ju l- 12 S ep -1 2 N o v- 12 Ja n -1 3 M ar -1 3 M ay -1 3 Ju l- 13 S ep -1 3 N o v- 13 Ja n -1 4 MMF average yield 1D notice deposit rate ceiling Demand deposit rate ceiling % % Yield spread Net cash flow 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究16 Exhibit 16: Bank WMPs in China have grown dramatically since 2009, effectively competing with T+1 & +2 MMFs until T+0 MMFs emerged in 2H12 Exhibit 17: Bank WMPs with maturity of 3 months generate higher yields than MMFs, which hindered the growth of MMFs without T+0 Note: MMF yield is based on the average return of the 82 MMFs offering T+0 redemption at present. 资料来源:CBRC,Wind, Gao Hua Securities Research 资料来源:Wind, Gao Hua Securities Research - 300 600 900 1,200 1,500 1,800 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 1H 13 3Q 13 bank WMPMMF(RHS) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Ja n -1 0 M ar -1 0 M ay -1 0 Ju l- 10 S ep -1 0 N o v- 10 Ja n -1 1 M ar -1 1 M ay -1 1 Ju l- 11 S ep -1 1 N o v- 11 Ja n -1 2 M ar -1 2 M ay -1 2 Ju l- 12 S ep -1 2 N o v- 12 Ja n -1 3 M ar -1 3 M ay -1 3 Ju l- 13 S ep -1 3 N o v- 13 Ja n -1 4 MMF average yield 1WWMP 3MWMPRmb bn 2014年1月29日 全球投资研究 Exhibit 18: US banks’ 资料来源:USFederal Reserve, Gao Rapid growth of T+0 MMFs coul The vicious cycle of depos We estimate China banks’ ad investments – already approa assets could only account for This significantly increases th MMDAs failed to compete with MMFs on yields o Hua Securities Research. d raise system liquidity risks sit outflows to T+0 MMFs could push up sector L/D ratios as well a djusted L/D ratios – the sum of credit securitization through banks’ WMPs, in ached 77% in 1H13, vs. reported L/D of 68%. We estimate the free funds fo r 3% of total deposits in 1H13, down from 14.6% in FY10. he tightness of China’s interbank liquidity. 中国:银行 17 as interbank rates nterbank assets and securitized or banks to invest in bonds and 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究18 Exhibit 19: Banks’ free deposits allocated to interbank and government bonds, etc., declined to only 3% of total deposits in 1H13, down from 15% in 2010 Exhibit 20: Adjusted LDR rose rapidly due to credit securitization (incl. NSCAs (non-standard credit assets) in repos, investments and WMPs) 资料来源:PBOC, CBRC, Gao Hua Securities Research 资料来源:PBOC, CBRC, Gao Hua Securities Research Mechanism of the vicious cycle We are concerned that this vicious cycle – or negative feedback loop – will drive continued rapid growth of T+0 MMF off a low base and increase liquidity risks in the banking sector. The mechanism of the vicious cycle works as follows: 1. Higher yields of T+0 MMF attract more deposit outflow from banks to MMF funds, thus raising bank’s L/D ratios. 2. In turn, banks have to raise deposit rates to compete for deposits to meet their L/D requirement, thus raising interbank rates higher. 3. As China T+0 MMFs invest largely in China interbank deposits (60% to 80% of AUM), rising interbank rates increase their yields, and in turn attract more deposit outflow. 68.468.4 72.6 76.476.7 16.114.6 6.43.63.3 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 20092010201120121H13 Adjusted LDR incl. interbank securitization Free money(deposits -required reserve -adjusted loans) as % deposits % 68.468.4 72.6 76.476.7 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 20 09 20 10 20 11 20 12 1H 13 Adjusted LDR incl. interbank securitization Adjusted LDR incl. interbank and off/b WMPs% 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究19 Exhibit 21: Rapid growth of MMFs in the mid to long term could attract a significant amount of demand deposits away from banks, driving banks’ funding costs up, causing rising L/D ratios, and leading to even higher interbank rates and MMF yields Note: the sizes were as of 2013. The yields are based on the range of monthly average data since the latest rate cut in July 2013. 资料来源:Wind, Gao Hua Securities Research MMF liquidity risks: potential to trigger substantial redemptions similar to bank runs Under normal circumstances, the value of MMFs that are priced under amortized cost method or penny-round method would be stable at one dollar. For China MMFs, which typically use amortized cost method, underlying securities are treated as held-to-maturity, and thus can’t “break the dollar” (i.e. fall below 1) unless the price is over 0.5% lower than the shadow price (mark-to-market value), according to the CSRC. Many MMFs in the US adopt the rounding shadow price to the nearest penny in the event of a fund reaching a $1.00 share price. However, if interest rates surge or asset quality of bond investments deteriorates dramatically, we believe China MMFs could “break the dollar”, leading to substantial redemption. Such an event could trigger large withdrawals similar to bank runs and force a fund to liquidate assets, which in turn would likely cause further securities losses or delay redemption. Moreover, China MMFs are not subject to the open market operations of the central banks, and do not have a lender of last resort like banks. Significant redemptions would subject them to liquidity risks as they would have to borrow from the interbank market to meet requests. There had been only one case of breaking the buck in the US before 2008, and many investors didn’t realize such a liquidity risk existed until Reserve Primary MMF “broke the dollar” during the 2008 crisis. Reserve Primary had to write off its Lehman holdings and fell to 97 cents, which resulted in investor anxiety and almost caused a run on money funds. Other MMFs also faced claims from investors until the US Treasury offered an optional program to insure the one dollar per MMF share. After the event, USMMFs’ AUM declined by 13% in 2009. Size Rmb0.9tn Average yield 3%-5.6% MMF Interbank rate rise Size Rmb31tn, yield0.35%-0.385% Interbank negotiable deposits Funding cost 2-7% Size Rmb19tn More deposits flowing to MMF LDR increase Deposit rate rise Demand deposits 2014年1月29日 全球投资研究 Exhibit 22: In the US, crisis 资料来源:USFederal Reserve, Gao China T+0 MMFs could be sophisticated regulation Currently, as China T+0 MMF redemption and liquidity need However, in the medium term rate risk due to relatively loos Exhibit 23 compares detai The maximum portfo China imposes less diversification is muc USMMFs are requir statements but with the Reserve Primary MMF “broke the dollar” and triggered substantia o Hua Securities Research. e more exposed to liquidity risks than USMMFs if they grow bigge Fs are still seeing fund inflows and their sizes are relatively small, it might n ds with their own capital, or by borrowing from interbank markets. m, if they grow significantly larger (e.g. to the Rmb1 tn level), they could be m se regulation on liquidity requirements, and lower liquidity of underlying bon ils of USMMF regulations with China MMF regulations in terms of olio maturity required by the CSRC is 180 days vs.60 days in the US. stringent requirements for daily/weekly liquid asset levels, and we believe t ch broader than in the US. red to provide detailed monthly disclosures for each underlying security, wh no requirement to disclose details of underlying securities. 中国:银行 20 al redemptions during the 2008 r, and thus may need more ot be difficult for them to meet net more exposed to liquidity risk/interest d markets than in the US. liquidity management: the China standard for portfolio hile China requires quarterly financial 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究21 Exhibit 23: US allows T+0 MMF redemption but with stricter regulation than China on asset mix, liquidity and disclosure requirements Detailed comparison of China and US approaches to MMF regulation 资料来源:PBOC, CSRC, SEC. China MMFUSMMF Invested assets Daily liquid assets (5pp of portfolio). Bonds with maturity less than 398 days. Time deposits/PBOC bills/bond repos with maturity less than one year. Non-AAA corp bonds are prohibited. Less than 30pp exposure to time deposits, but time deposits with early redemption rights and immunity from interest income punishment are not included. Daily liquid assets (10pp of portfolio) and weekly liquid assets (30pp+). Instruments with remaining maturity of less than 398 days. Non-1st tier securities (1st tier refers to highest rating of a short-term security, govt security, MMF, comparable quality security) should not be over 3% of total assets or have a maturity of over 45 days. <10pp exposure to illiquid securities. Portfolio maturity Within 180 days. Within 60 days. Leverage Repo borrowing <20% of NAV. Borrow no more than one-third of total assets. Borrow no more than 5% of the fund’s total assets for emergency. In practice rely on little if any borrowing. Portfolio diversification <10pp exposure to any corp bond issuer. <30pp exposure to banks with custody license. <5pp exposure to banks without custody license. <5pp exposure to any issuer. <0.5pp exposure to non-1st tier securities of any issuer (other than govt securities). Disclosure Quarterly disclosure of portfolio maturity. No requirement for individual security disclosure. Monthly disclosure of maturity, category/issuer/yield/value/maturity of every security, etc. in N-MFP report. Share Price Calculation Shadow pricing (mark to market) or amortized cost pricing. Penny-round method or amortized cost pricing. 2014年1月29日 全球投资研究 Exhibit 24: China MMFs have much longer weighted days than the US 资料来源:Wind, ICI, Gao Hua Securities Research Exhibit 26: China MMFs’ invested assets have large negotiated deposits 资料来源:Wind, Gao Hua Securities Research 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1Q112Q113Q114Q111Q122Q123Q124Q121Q132Q1 d average maturity Exhibit 25: China MMF borrowing as 资料来源:Wind, Gao Hua Securities Research e exposure to OTC Exhibit 27: USMMFs’ exposure to ba 资料来源:ICI, Gao Hua Securities Research 33Q13 Non-financial assets Cash and deposits Reverse repo Bond 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 '86 '88 '90 '92 '94 '96 '98 '00 '02 ' 中国:银行 22 % of NAV was about 10% in 2013 anks is mostly liquid CDs/notes 04 '06 '08 '10 '12 Others Bank note CDs Reverse repo Corp paper/note US govt agency issues Treasury 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究23 Rationale for regulatory review of L/D & MMF We believe the rapid growth of T+0 MMF puts pressure on banks’ deposits given the L/D ratio requirement, and could drive instability within the banking system if L/D ratios continue to rise. Although China’s T+0 MMFs offer better returns than short-term deposits for clients, we believe continued rapid T+0 MMF growth may raise funding costs for banks and corporates, as well as bank system L/D and liquidity risks in the medium to long term. Long term, we believe the potential impact could be more severe than the US experience during the 1970s to 1990s, as China’s 75% L/D ratio cap could force banks to compete more aggressively for deposits than the US banks did. We believe it makes sense for China regulators to carefully review/revise MMF and banking regulations in the following areas: Revisiting the L/D ratio cap with a view to releasing the increasing deposit competition pressure. By replacing the L/D ratio with a more sophisticated Basel III liquidity ratio requirement, we believe China banks could refocus on finding good borrowers, rather than rapidly extending loans to generate new deposits through informal securitization to hide loans in banks’ WMP, interbank and securitized investment assets. Strengthening the regulation of MMFT+0 functions by either: o Directly prohibiting T+0 redemption and payment functions, which make MMF similar to bank demand deposits, as UK regulators did, or o Imposing sophisticated regulation on MMF portfolio mix, maturity, and disclosures to shorten the duration of assets, and thus lower their liquidity risks/returns. For China T+0 MMF, we believe portfolio managers would benefit from a stricter minimum requirement for daily and weekly assets, as this could help to prepare for T+0 withdrawals under normal circumstances. In addition, we think there is room to shorten China MMFs’ maximum portfolio maturity, which is much longer than that in the US (180 days vs.60 in the US and as proposed in the EU). Otherwise, China domestic MMFs’ value could suffer more from interest rate fluctuation, particularly from the interbank rate hike at each quarter end. Improving transparency of asset mix and disclosure requirements by requiring monthly disclosure of each underlying security, including maturity, return, counter party risks, etc. would prevent MMF managers from operating MMFs on an asset-pool basis. Without transparent disclosure, the implementation of regulations could be discounted. For instance, MMFs could arbitrage the limitations of leverage or maturity via irregular and non-transparent bond repos, which has happened to a few MMFs in the past. Strengthening MMF regulations has been a common trend in many countries post the 2008 global financial crisis, with many countries proposing stricter regulations to minimize liquidity risks. For instance, recognizing the liquidity risk of MMFs, the USSEC proposed two alternative options: 1) adopting floating NAVs, and 2) requiring liquidity gate rates and redemption fees during stressed events. In contrast, EU regulators have proposed requiring fund managers to: 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究24 either use floating NAV, or prepare a 3% NAV buffer for constant NAV, raise liquidity standards, and prohibit leverage, including short-selling money market instruments, securities lending, repurchase agreements, borrowing and lending cash. Exhibit 28: China MMFs have many regulatory advantages over China banks. Regulators allow MMFs with T+0 cash withdrawal and payment functions to be sold via internet channels with relatively loose requirements on liquidity, maturity and disclosure. Banks, however, face much stricter regulations like L/D ratio cap,20% RRR and rate ceiling, etc. Comparison of MMF regulators and regulations, and bank deposit regulations in China, the US, UK, and EU 资料来源:PBOC, CSRC, SEC, Gao Hua Securities Research China MMFUSMMFUK-authorized MMFEU proposal Regulator PBOC & CSRC. The CBRC can oversee bank loans for MMFs aimed at supporting T+0 redemption. SEC. The USFederal Reserve and other bank authorities don't have authority over MMFs. FCA, which regulates both banks and mutual funds. EUCommission. MMF redemption Allow T+0 redemption. CSRC allows PMs to buy MMFs from withdrawers with their own capital or bank loans instantly on T+0. PMs can then convert those shares to cash to balance positions on T+1. Allow T+0 redemption Prohibit T+0 redemption. Only banks are permitted to operate T+0 cash business. T+0 permission dependent on detailed regulations in each country. Other MMF regulation Significantly fewer regulations on maturity, diversification, underlying security rating, disclosure. Strict regulations covering maturity, diversification, rating, transparency, etc. N/A 3% NAV buffer if no floating NAV. Strict regulation on liquidity, leverage, diversification, etc. Bank deposit regulation 75% L/D ratio,18-20% RRR, deposit ceiling (1.1x benchmark rate) 0-10% RRRVoluntary reserve ratio 1% RRR 2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究25 信息披露附录 分析师申明 我们,吴双、马宁、李南, CFA,在此申明,本报告所表述的所有观点准确反映了我们对上述公司或其证券的个人看法。

此外,我们的薪金的任何部分不曾与,不与,也将不会与本报告中的具体推荐意见或观点直 接或间接相关。

投资摘要 投资摘要部分通过将一只股票的主要指标与其行业和市场相比较来评价该股的投资环境。

所描述的四个主要指标包括增长、回报、估值倍数和波动性。

增长、回报和估值倍数都是运用数种方法综合计算而成,以确 定该股在地区研究行业内所处的百分位排名。

每项指标的准确计算方式可能随着财务年度、行业和所属地区的不同而有所变化,但标准方法如下: 增长是下一年预测与当前年度预测的综合比较,如每股盈利、EBITDA和收入等。

回报是各项资本回报指标一年预测的加总,如CROCI、平均运用资本回报率和净资产回报率。

估值倍数根据一年预期估值比率综 合计算,如市盈率、股息收益率、EV/FCF、EV/EBITDA、EV/DACF、市净率。

波动性根据12个月的历史波动性计算并经股息调整。

Quantum Quantum是提供具体财务报表数据历史、预测和比率的高盛专有数据库,它可以用于对单一公司的深入分析,或在不同行业和市场的公司之间进行比较。

GSSUSTAIN GSSUSTAIN是侧重于长期做多建议的相对稳定的全球投资策略。

GSSUSTAIN关注名单涵盖了我们认为相对于全球同业具有持续竞争优势和出色的资本回报、因而有望在长期内表现出色的行业领军企业。

我们 对领军企业的筛选基于对以下三方面的量化分析:现金投资的现金回报、行业地位和管理水平(公司管理层对行业面临的环境、社会和企业治理方面管理的有效性)。

信息披露 相关的股票研究范围 马宁:中国金融行业。

李南, CFA:中国券商、中国金融行业。

中国券商:中信证券(A)、中信证券(H)、银河证券、招商证券、光大证券、海通证券(A)、海通证券(H)。

中国金融行业:农业银行(A)、农业银行(H)、北京银行、中国银行(A)、中国银行(H)、重庆银行、交通银行(A)、交通银行(H)、南京银行、宁波银行、中信银行(A)、中信银行(H)、中国信达、建设银行(A)、建设银行 (H)、光大银行、中国人寿(A)、中国人寿(H)、招商银行(A)、招商银行(H)、民生银行(A)、民生银行(H)、中国太保(A)、中国太保(H)、中国太平、重庆农村商业银行、远东宏信、华夏银行、兴业银行、工商银行 (A)、工商银行(H)、新华保险(A)、新华保险(H)、人保集团、人保财险、平安银行、中国平安(A)、中国平安(H)、浦发银行。

公司评级、研究行业及评级和相关定义 买入、中性、卖出:分析师建议将评为买入或卖出的股票纳入地区投资名单。

一只股票在投资名单中评为买入或卖出由其相对于所属研究行业的潜在回报决定。

任何未获得买入或卖出评级的股票均被视为中性评 级。

每个地区投资评估委员会根据25-35%的股票评级为买入、10-15%的股票评级为卖出的全球指导原则来管理该地区的投资名单;但是,在某一特定行业买入和卖出评级的分布可能根据地区投资评估委员会的决 定而有所不同。

地区强力买入或卖出名单是以潜在回报规模或实现回报的可能性为主要依据的投资建议。

潜在回报:代表当前股价与一定时间范围内预测目标价格之差。

分析师被要求对研究范围内的所有股票给出目标价格。

潜在回报、目标价格及相关时间范围在每份加入投资名单或重申维持在投资名单的研究报告中 都有注明。

研究行业及评级:分析师给出下列评级中的其中一项代表其根据行业历史基本面及/或估值对研究对象的投资前景的看法。

具吸引力(A):未来12个月内投资前景优于研究范围的历史基本面及/或估值。

中性(N): 未来12个月内投资前景相对研究范围的历史基本面及/或估值持平。

谨慎(C):未来12个月内投资前景劣于研究范围的历史基本面及/或估值。

暂无评级(NR):在高盛高华于涉及该公司的一项合并交易或战略性交易中担任咨询顾问时并在某些其他情况下,投资评级和目标价格已经根据高华证券的政策予以除去。

暂停评级(RS):由于缺乏足够的基础去确定 投资评级或价格目标,或在发表报告方面存在法律、监管或政策的限制,我们已经暂停对这种股票给予投资评级和价格目标。

此前对这种股票作出的投资评级和价格目标(如有的话)将不再有效,因此投资者不应依 赖该等资料。

暂停研究(CS):我们已经暂停对该公司的研究。

没有研究(NC):我们没有对该公司进行研究。

不存在或不适用(NA):此资料不存在或不适用。

无意义(NM):此资料无意义,因此不包括在报告内。

一般披露 本报告在中国由高华证券分发。

高华证券具备证券投资咨询业务资格。

本研究报告仅供我们的客户使用。

本研究报告是基于我们认为可靠的目前已公开的信息,但我们不保证该信息的准确性和完整性,客户也不应该依赖该信息是准确和完整的。

我们会适时地更新我们的研究,但各种 规定可能会阻止我们这样做。

除了一些定期出版的行业报告之外,绝大多数报告是在分析师认为适当的时候不定期地出版。

高盛高华为高华证券的关联机构,从事投资银行业务。

高华证券、高盛高华及它们的关联机构与本报告中涉及的大部分公司保持着投资银行业务和其它业务关系。

2014年1月29日 中国:银行 全球投资研究26 我们的销售人员、交易员和其它专业人员可能会向我们的客户及我们的自营交易部提供与本研究报告中的观点截然相反的口头或书面市场评论或交易策略。

我们的自营交易部和投资业务部可能会做出与本报告的建 议或表达的意见不一致的投资决策。

本报告中署名的分析师可能已经与包括高华证券销售人员和交易员在内的我们的客户讨论,或在本报告中讨论交易策略,其中提及可能会对本报告讨论的证券市场价格产生短期影响的推动因素或事件,该影响在方 向上可能与分析师发布的股票目标价格相反。

任何此类交易策略都区别于且不影响分析师对于该股的基本评级,此类评级反映了某只股票相对于报告中描述的研究范围内股票的回报潜力。

高华证券及其关联机构、高级职员、董事和雇员,不包括股票分析师和信贷分析师,将不时地对本研究报告所涉及的证券或衍生工具持有多头或空头头寸,担任上述证券或衍生工具的交易对手,或买卖上述证券或 衍生工具。

在任何要约出售股票或征求购买股票要约的行为为非法的地区,本报告不构成该等出售要约或征求购买要约。

本报告不构成个人投资建议,也没有考虑到个别客户特殊的投资目标、财务状况或需求。

客户应考虑本 报告中的任何意见或建议是否符合其特定状况,以及(若有必要)寻求专家的意见,包括税务意见。

本报告中提及的投资价格和价值以及这些投资带来的收入可能会波动。

过去的表现并不代表未来的表现,未来的回 报也无法保证,投资者可能会损失本金。

外汇汇率波动有可能对某些投资的价值或价格或来自这一投资的收入产生不良影响。

某些交易,包括牵涉期货、期权和其它衍生工具的交易,有很大的风险,因此并不适合所有投资者。

投资者可以向高华销售代表取得或通过取得当前的 期权披露文件。

对于包含多重期权买卖的期权策略结构产品,例如,期权差价结构产品,其交易成本可能较高。

与交易相关的文件将根据要求提供。

北京高华证券有限责任公司版权所有 2014年 未经北京高华证券有限责任公司事先书面同意,本材料的任何部分均不得(i)以任何方式制作任何形式的拷贝、复印件或复制品,或(ii)再次分发。

推荐给朋友: 收藏    |      
尊敬的用户您好!
         为了让您更全面、更快捷、更深度的使用本服务,请您"立即下载" 安装《慧博智能策略终端
         使用终端不仅可以免费查阅各大机构的研究报告,第一手的投资资讯,还提供大量研报加工数据,盈利预测数据,历史财务数据,宏观经济数据,以及宏观及行业研究思路,公司研究方法,可多角度观测市场,用更多维度的视点辅助投资者作出投资决策。
         目前本终端广泛应用于券商,公募基金,私募基金,保险,银行理财,信托,QFII,上市公司战略部,资产管理公司,投资咨询公司,VC/PE等。
慧博投资分析手机版 手机扫码轻松下载